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Abstract—Recent advances in Deep Neural Networks (DNN)
and Edge Computing have made it possible to automatically
analyze streams of videos from home/security cameras over
hierarchical clusters that include edge devices, close to the video
source, as well as remote cloud compute resources. However,
preserving the privacy and confidentiality of users’ sensitive
data as it passes through different devices remains a concern to
most users. Private user data is subject to attacks by malicious
attackers or misuse by internal administrators who may use
the data in activities that are not explicitly approved by the
user. To address this challenge, we present Serdab, a distributed
orchestration framework for deploying deep neural network
computation across multiple secure enclaves (e.g., Intel SGX).
Secure enclaves provide a guarantee on the privacy of the
data/code deployed inside it. However, their limited hardware
resources make them inefficient when solely running an entire
deep neural network. To bridge this gap, Serdab presents a DNN
partitioning strategy to distribute the layers of the neural network
across multiple enclave devices or across an enclave device and
other hardware accelerators. Our partitioning strategy achieves
up to 4.7x speedup compared to executing the entire neural
network in one enclave.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) applications generate massive
amounts of real-time data. A large amount of this data comes
from cameras. For example, estimates suggest the clusters of
cameras on board of a smart vehicle are going to generate 3
TB of data per day and reports by Information Handling Ser-
vices (IHS) indicate that 245 million professionally installed
surveillance cameras are operating worldwide as of 2015 [2].
Owners of such cameras strive to make predictions/inference
from large streams of video feeds, often by deploying and
serving deep neural network (DNN) models. However, due to
the significant amount of data generated by IoT devices, it
is infeasible to send the data to a centralized cloud and get
the response in timely manner. For this reason, the concept
of edge computing [25] has emerged. Edge computing refers
to the computing and storage infrastructure that exists close
to the sources of data. An IoT application can be deployed
on multiple hops of these edge devices where some analysis
is done on a raspberry pi and the rest of the analysis runs
in an edge data center. However, deploying IoT applications
on the edge poses security and privacy challenges because
users remain skeptical about the confidentiality of their input
data and whether private user data is used by edge computing
vendors in other applications.
To address the data confidentiality problem for
edge/cloud computing, researchers proposed cryptographic
approaches [12] [22] to enable privacy-preserving predictions.
Although the performance of such approaches has significantly
improved, they still remain impractical for production
environments. On-device inference has also been proposed to
protect data confidentiality [27] [17] through processing parts
of the application in the client’s device and preventing the
private data from leaving the client’s device. However, such
approaches consume a significant amount of computation
and energy from the resource-constrained client devices.
As an alternative, several systems [16] [18] have proposed
using trusted execution environments -also known as TEEs
or enclaves- such as Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX)
to run machine learning workloads while preserving data
confidentiality. In such systems, the private data is only
decrypted within the trusted execution environment which
is protected from all privileged software in the system
such as operating system and virtual machine monitors.
However, SGX-based computation is currently performance-
and memory-constrained. For example, TEE workloads
cannot exploit accelerated linear algebra libraries. It also has
a limited memory size (128 MB) which limits the amount
of computation that can be done within one TEE and it
becomes essential to delegate part of the computation to run
in another hardware accelerator (e.g., GPU, CPU, or another
enclave) that sits in the same or a different edge device.
Previous work has proposed different techniques to partition
computation across enclave and a co-located hardware
accelerator to improve the latency and privacy [26] [13].
However, little work has been done on addressing the problem
of partitioning computation across multiple enclaves that sit
in geo-distributed edge devices. A key hurdle to adoption
of this paradigm is the lack of a platform ecosystem that
simplifies the deployment, and management of applications,
seamlessly across multiple enclaves that sit in different
devices. In this paper, we present Serdab1, a distributed
orchestration framework that allows deploying deep neural
network computation across multiple enclaves. A major
challenge that Serdab addresses is how to optimally distribute
deep neural network computation across an enclave and other
devices (e.g., other enclaves or hardware accelerators). This
is especially important considering the resource constraints
of the enclave (e.g., 128 MB) that makes it inadequate to
efficiently support running a deep neural network entirely
within one enclave. An important question that we address
in this paper is how to partition the NN layers to reduce
the overall latency of computation for a stream of video
frames while maintaining data confidentiality. To address this
challenge we leverage an interesting insight that the output
of intermediate layers of a convolutional neural network
1An ancient Egyptian tomb structure in which secret chambers (enclaves)
are connected with secret passages (communication channels)
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becomes dissimilar to the original input towards the last
layers [29]. For example, the output of layer 5 is less similar
to the original image compared to the output of layer 1.
This insight can be used to run layers 1-5 inside the enclave
to protect data confidentiality and offload the rest of the
computation to an edge device that has a processor with more
computing power (e.g., CPU or GPU). One disadvantage with
this approach is that the majority of the layers might end up
running in the enclave, leaving only a few layers to the faster
processor. This problem is more critical in IoT applications
because such applications typically require processing a
stream of video frames and if most of the layers run on
the enclave, the enclave will become the bottleneck and the
entire application will be slowed down by the queuing time
on the enclave, yielding the other processor idle waiting for
the enclave. Our approach to solve this is to distribute the
DNN layers across multiple enclaves. In this approach, the
partitioning can happen at any layer because the intermediate
data can only be decrypted in the next enclave. This helps
the partitioning to be distributed equally across both enclaves
which reduces the queuing delay, provides better resource
utilization, and reduces the overall latency of processing a
stream of frames. In this paper, we propose a method for
partitioning Neural Network (NN) layers across multiple
devices to process a stream of video frames. We compare
our approach with different approaches for partitioning NN
layers, and we discuss their applicability to IoT applications.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We propose a framework to compute IoT applications
across multiple enclave devices or across an enclave
device and other hardware accelerators.
• We propose a novel technique to find the best partition-
ing of neural networks computation across distributed
resources. A key advantage in our neural network parti-
tioning approach, that was not explored in previous work,
is to leverage pipeline parallelism in which we consider
that both enclaves concurrently execute different video
frames.
• A complete end-to-end implementation and evaluation of
the platform using a diverse set of videos that vary in
the type of objects, resolution, and the geo-location in
which the video was captured. Our results show that for a
dataset of more than 10,000 video frames, our partitioning
approach can achieve up to 4.7x speedup over the running
the entire neural network in one enclave.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
discusses background, motivation, and the threat model. In
section III, we describe our system architecture. We define
the problem of privacy-aware placement in section IV and we
present our technique to solve it in section V. We evaluate our
system in section VI. In section VIII, we discuss the related
work. Section IX concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
A. Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)
Trusted Execution Environment such as Software Guard
Extensions (SGX [9]) is available on Intel processors starting
with Skylake. TEE provides a secure area in the processor
that protects code and data from all other privileged software
on the platform. The code in the TEE is executed safely on
Fig. 1. Intrusion detection application using security cameras. Example
application that benefits from processing in the TEE.
secret data that nobody outside the TEE can have access to it
including the hardware vendor (e.g., Intel). The privacy and
integrity of the code/data inside the TEE is enforced by the
hardware. TEEs are sometimes called enclaves, and we use
both terms interchangeably in this paper. Intel SGX supports
remote attestation of the code and data in the TEE [3]. This
enables a remote user to verify the trustworthiness of the
hardware and the integrity of the TEE contents (i.e., code
and data). The size of the memory reserved to the TEE is
limited to 128 MB. However, SGX supports paging in which
the rarely used Enclave Page Cache (EPC) pages are evicted
to the unprotected main memory, but they remain encrypted
to ensure confidentiality. With paging, applications in TEE
can use more than 128 MB at the expense of encrypting
and decrypting the evicted pages which poses an additional
efficiency challenge.
B. Example Application and Threat Model
Figure 1 shows an example application of intrusion detec-
tion. In this application, the user installs cameras to monitor
the area around his house, and he wants to run computer
vision software that analyzes the videos from the installed
cameras to detect threats like: (1) the presence of intruders
in the backyard, (2) car break-ins, (3) package theft. Many
users/application developers do not have the expertise/compute
resources to deploy such software services in their houses, so
they utilize services provided by public cloud providers (e.g.,
AWS) or edge providers (e.g., VaporIO). However, there are
several key requirements that users need to consider in order
to trust such services:
• Code Integrity: Assuming that the user knows the
code/deep learning model he/she wants to run on the data,
how to ensure that service provider is running the exact
code that the user (app developer) submitted remains a
concern. Malicious/Compromised service providers can
drop the code and return random results or can inject
code that makes copies of private user data.
• Data Privacy: Even if the code remains unchanged by
the cloud/edge service provider, users want to ensure that
they get the right predictions without their data being
revealed to the service provider. User’s data can contain
private information about the activities they do around
the house, the cars they own, and the guests coming to
visit them. Users want to ensure that the data cannot be
seen in an unencrypted form except by the software that
analyzes the data.
Threat Model: The security objective of Serdab is to
protect the privacy of user inputs (e.g., home camera feed)
that are being used by deep learning inference services hosted
by third-party edge/cloud providers. There are four parties in
our system: (1) The user that owns the video data (e.g., home-
owner), (2) The App developer that developed the Deep Neural
Network (DNN) inference service, (3) Serdab framework that
deploys the DNN inference service in the edge devices or
cloud platform, and (4) The edge/cloud provider that manages
the hardware resources that execute the inference on the user’s
data. The user trusts the app developer in providing a privacy-
preserving DNN inference. The user and the App developer
do not trust Serdab framework to deploy the required services
in the Intel SGX devices supported by the cloud provider.
However, both the user and the App developer have a method,
provided by Intel [3], to perform remote attestation on all the
trusted hardware that they rent to ensure that the code has
actually been deployed by Serdab. The edge/cloud provider
is the adversary in our threat model, and its goal is to steal
user inputs but provide correct output. We assume that the
edge/cloud provider has no incentive to produce false outputs,
but they have incentive to keep the user’s data for use in other
activities that are not explicitly approved by the user such as
Targeted Advertisements [19]. This is now common that an
attacker wants to use data for their economic benefit so they
will not damage the system and quietly leak the data. In our
setup, the edge/cloud provider administrators are capable of
accessing on-cloud software and hardware resources except the
SGX’s enclaves. The communication channel from the user’s
cameras to the enclave and between enclaves is protected by
TLS or similar secure protocols. We note that although the
data transmission between enclaves has to happen through the
untrusted hardware, users can attest that each enclave encrypts
its output before being transmitted to the next enclave. We do
not consider the SGX side-channel attacks [14], which can
be prevented [23], as well as Denial of Services (DoS). We
assume that the DNN models to be deployed in the cloud
are trained in a secured environment, the model parameters
are not leaked to adversaries during model training, and the
user’s camera(s) are not compromised by adversaries.
III. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
To address the requirements specified in Section II, we
propose a framework to support distributed analysis of IoT
data streams across multiple enclave devices. We focus on
visual IoT streams which come from cameras owned by
users/organizations (e.g., surveillance cameras, home cameras,
wearable cameras, etc). An architectural overview of the
proposed framework is presented in Figure 2. The top com-
ponent is the application layer which defines an application
in the form of a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) of func-
tions/operators. In this paper, we focus on DNN applications
in which the application is a NN model, defined as a DAG
of NN layers {Lx}x=Mx=1 . Each layer Lx represents a compute
operation. The layers in a DNN model include: convolutional
layers (that combine nearby pixels via convolution opera-
tors), pooling layers (that reduce the dimensionality of the
subsequent layers), rectified linear unit (ReLU) layers (that
perform a non-linear transformation), and fully connected
layers (that perform matrix addition, multiplications). The
framework manages multiple devices that could be connected
either via local area network or a wide area network. In
Figure 2, we show two devices (edge 1 and edge 2) at different
locations connected via a wide area network and each device
has a trusted enclave.
Edge-Cloud Orchestration: The second component from
the top in Figure 2 is an edge-cloud orchestration framework
which provides an abstraction for deployment and manage-
ment of NN layers across edge 1 and edge 2 dataflow engines.
The orchestration engine is a control component that can be
deployed in edge 1 or edge 2 or another device controlled by
the user but connected to edge 1 and edge 2 via a local or
wide area network. The orchestration engine has a Resource
Manager which carries information about which compute re-
sources are available to execute the NN model (e.g., edge 1 and
edge 2). We assume that the edge/cloud provider reports the
available resources (devices) correctly. The Resource Manager
receives requests to dynamically register new resources and
removes old ones. The orchestration framework includes an
Application Manager that sends a request to the local dataflow
engine of both edge 1 and edge 2 to deploy the subset of the
layers assigned to each device. The Application Manager also
allows encrypted data to flow from one Data-flow Engine to
another by deploying a transmission operator in each Data-
flow Engine. The transmission operator pushes the output of
the final layer in one Data-flow Engine to the first layer in the
next data-flow engine.
Privacy-aware Placement: Before the Application man-
ager enacts the deployment, it consults the privacy-aware
placement service to find the best placement of layers across
devices. The main goal of the privacy-aware placement is to
consider the available resources (i.e., edge/cloud devices) to
improve the latency of the application without violating the
data privacy. The privacy-aware placement tries to reduce the
amount of layers computed with one TEE through offloading
the rest of the layers to another untrusted device or another
enclave. However, the privacy-aware placement has to ensure
that the output of the layers coming out of one enclave to an
untrusted device is sufficiently dissimilar to the original image.
We provide more details about the privacy-aware placement
and our definition of image similarity in Section V.
Dataflow Engine: Below the edge-cloud orchestration
workflow is the set of dataflow engines. Each edge device has
a local stream processing engine that handles the execution of
the sub-DAG of layers that are deployed in it. The dataflow
engine plays a management role within one device, particularly
it handles the dataflow between the trusted and untrusted
hardware in the same device. Each operator in the dataflow
engine acts as a client to a service that is implemented in the
trusted hardware or a regular CPU. The operator calls the NN
Inference service and passes the encrypted data to it. The NN
inference will be described in detail in the next section. The
calling operator gets back the encrypted result to forward to
the next operator. Some operators are transmission operators
that do not talk to any service but instead they forward the
data over the wide area network to the data-flow engine in
another edge device.
NN Inference Service: The NN inference service is imple-
mented as a gRPC service enclosed within a Docker container.
When the service is initially deployed, Serdab informs the
user to upload the encrypted model parameters directly to the
enclave service. The encrypted model parameters will only
contain the layers that this enclave is supposed to serve. Once
the model parameters are loaded, the gRPC service starts
receiving encrypted video frames and executes the inference
Fig. 2. Serdab System Architecture.
Fig. 3. Example Resource graph
through Tensorflow Lite (TFlite) library which is a lightweight
implementation of TensorFlow [8] for resource-constrained
devices such as SGX.
IV. MODELS AND PROBLEM DEFINITION
The performance and memory limitations of TEE (e.g., 128
MB in SGX) make it in-adequate to efficiently support running
an entire deep and complex neural network model. Hence,
privacy-aware placement aims to explore different ways in
which some layers of the neural network are offloaded from a
TEE to another device or another TEE with the aim to improve
latency while ensuring that the data remains private. In this
section, we define the problem of privacy-aware placement.
We start by describing the NN model, compute resource
model, and IoT data model. Then we formally define the
problem. In Section V, we present the intuition behind our
approach and the algorithm to solve it. In both sections, we
follow the notation in Table I.
Resource Model: We model the physical resources as a
weighted directed graph GR = (VR, ER), as shown in
Figure 3, where the vertices VR = {E1, E2, TEE1, TEE2}
represent two edge devices E1 and E2. Each device can have
a trusted execution environment (TEE). We refer to the TEE
inside E1 as TEE1, similarly we refer to the TEE inside E2
as TEE2. We divide the resources (devices) into two distinct
sets: trusted resources VRT and untrusted resources VRUT ,
where VRT = {TEE1, TEE2}, and VRUT = {E1, E2}.
The links ER = {(BE1→E2 , BE2→E1)} represent bandwidth
availability from E1 to E2 and vice versa.
IoT Data Model: We model the data as an unbounded
stream of video frames fy that can come from one or more
camera sources. We aggregate a sequence of video frames into
chunks, where each chunk has duration T . The kth chunk
chunkk can be defined as chunkk = 〈fk1 , fk2 , . . . fkn〉, where
n is the chunk size. The chunk duration/size is an application-
defined parameter to define how often the partitioning algo-
rithm gets invoked to dynamically change the partitioning.
TABLE I
TABLE OF NOTATION
M = Number of layers in a neural network
NN = Neural network model with M layers
TEEl = Trusted compute Resource
El = Untrusted compute Resource
VR = All Compute resources (e.g., TEE1, E1)
VRT = Trusted resources (e.g., TEE1, TEE2)
VRUT = Untrusted resources (e.g., E1, E2
Lx = Layer x in a neural network
ex,E1 = Execution time of Lx in E1
n = Total number of frames in a chunk
Lx@E1 = Placement of layer Lx in E1
Lx → Lz@E1 = Placement of layer Lx to Lz in E1
px = Resource (device) that Lx is placed on
Pj = defines a placement path j for each layer in
NN to a resource in VR
Lx = Layer x in a neural network
tchunk
(
n, Pj
)
= Completion time of a chunk of n frames
given placement Pj
fy = Frame y in a chunk of frames
I(Lx)y = Input to Lx when the input image is fy
Sim(I(L1), I(Lx)) = Similarity bet. input to Lx and input to L1
δ = Threshold on the similarity between 2 layers
DLx = Size (bytes) of output tensor of layer Lx
BE1,E2 = Bandwidth (bytes/sec) bet. E1 and E2
tr(E1
DLx−−−→ E2) = Transmission time (sec) bet. E1 and E2
Application Model: As described in Figure 2, we model
the application as a NN model that has multiple layers
NN = {Lx}x=Mx=1 . Each layer is a processing element such
as convolution or matrix multiplication. A link from layer L1
to layer L2 means that for a given video frame fy , L1 has to
be applied before L2 and the output of L1 is the input for L2.
NN Layer Profile: Each layer in the NN is associated with a
profile which includes:
1) The cost of executing layer Lx on a video frame fy ,
when placed on each compute resource. Layer Lx can
be placed on E1, TEE1, E2, or TEE2. Their corre-
sponding execution times are ex,E1 , ex,TEE1 , ex,E2 , and
ex,E2 . The execution includes the time to encrypt the
layer’s output.
2) The size of output data of layer Lx. We denote it as
DLx bytes. The output data of each layer is typically
n-dimensional matrix (i.e., tensor) and its size can be
derived from the resolution of the input frame.
3) The transmission time of DLx from E1 to E2,
tr(E1
DLx−−−→ E2) = DLx/BE1,E2 , where BE1,E2 is the
bandwidth (bytes/sec) from E1 to E2.
4) The similarity between the input to layer Lx, denoted
as I(Lx), and the original image f , which is also the
input to the first layer I(L1). The similarity is defined
by a similarity function Sim(I(L1), I(Lx)) (e.g., Pear-
son correlation coefficient, mean-squared error). This
similarity metric represents how much a layer leaks
information about the original image. To compute the
similarity, we use a dataset of 1000 diverse images and
we get the intermediate output of each layer. For each
image fy , we run similarity function between I(L1)y
and I(Lx)y , where I(Lx)y is the input to Lx when the
input image is fy . We compute the overall similarity
of the layer as the maximum across all the images:
Sim(I(L1), I(Lx)) = maxy(Sim(fy, I(Lx)y)).
Problem Definition: Consider a NN model NN =
Fig. 4. Output of intermediate layers of GoogLenet: left (original image),
middle (layer 1: maxpool), right (layer 4: maxpool)
{Lx}x=Mx=1 , which consists of M layers. Let VR = VRT ∪VRUT
be the list of available resources to execute the layers including
the list of trusted resources VRT and untrusted resources
VRUT . Let px denote the placement of an arbitrary layer
Lx on the compute resources that it will be executed on
px = rk | rk ∈ VR. A placement path Pj = (p1, p2, ..., pM )
defines a placement for each layer in NN to a resource
(device) in VR. We note that Pj defines one placement out
of combinatorial number of placement of layers in NN
on resources VR. For example, a simple placement P1 =
(TEE1, TEE1, ...TEE1, TEE1) denotes that all the layers
are placed on TEE1 while P2 = (TEE1, , ..., TEE2, TEE2)
denotes that some layers are placed on TEE1 and some are
placed on TEE2. Let n denote the number of video frames
(i.e., chunk size) processed by NN and let tchunk(n, Pj)
denote the time it takes to perform a complete execution of
NN on n video frames given a placement path Pj . The goal
of the privacy-aware placement is to find the path P ∗j that
minimizes the execution time tchunk(n, Pj):
P ∗j = argmin
Pj
(
tchunk
(
n, Pj
))
while satisfying at least one of the following privacy con-
straints:
C1: Each layer is executed within a trusted device.
∀px ∈ Pj , px ∈ VRT
C2: If a layer is executed in an untrusted device, then the
input to that layer has to be sufficiently dissimilar to the input
of the first layer of the original image (I(L1)). The similarity
is defined by the similarity function and a threshold δ.
∀px ∈ Pj if px ∈ VRUT , then Sim[I(Lx), I(L1)] < δ
V. PRIVACY-AWARE PLACEMENT
Our privacy-aware placement technique explores alternative
placement that can potentially improve the overall latency of
the NN application without violating the privacy. Our privacy-
aware placement method relies on two key insights:
• dissimilar intermediate outputs: Several studies have
been conducted to understand the internal mechanisms
of DNNs [29]. Such studies have shown that for an
image classification DNN, the first few layers (shallow
layers) represent low-level image processing operations
such as edges, corners, and contours of the original
inputs. On the other hand, later layers (i.e., deep layers)
represent more abstract and class-specific information
related to the final outputs. Figure 4 shows an illustrative
example for the output of layer 1 and layer 4 of Google’s
InceptionNet (GoogLenet). As shown in Figure 4, layer
1 does primitive image processing operations (e.g., edge
detection) so the content of the image is still visually
identifiable by humans acting as adversaries. However,
the output of layer 4 is significantly less similar to the
original image. This insight can be used in the context
of TEE to execute the first 4 layers inside the enclave
until the image becomes dissimilar to the original image.
The rest of the layers (after layer 4) can then be executed
in a regular processor to leverage hardware accelerators
such as GPUs. However, the question becomes what is
the minimum number of layers to be executed within
the resource-constrained TEE that is enough to conceal
the identity of the data. To answer this question, we
measure the correlation between the original input image
and each layer’s output. After experimenting with sev-
eral correlation metrics (e.g., mean-squared-error (MSE),
Pearson correlation coefficient, and structural image sim-
ilarity (SSIM)) and conducting a user study, we realize
that the most crucial metric that affects the correlation
between the input image and the intermediate layer is
the resolution (i.e., number of pixels) of intermediate
layer’s output. We notice that the output of each layer
has a grid of images (Figure 4), where each image in
the grid is either smaller than or equal to the images
in the input grid. This happens because convolution and
pooling operations reduce the number of pixels in each
image in the grid. We observe that when the output of
a layer has images with resolution less than or equal a
certain threshold (e.g., 20x20 pixels) then such output has
undergone enough transformations in which it cannot be
visually identified no matter how much you can resize
it. Hence, we conclude that the output of layer Lx is
considered private if the resolution of its output is below
certain threshold δ. We note that our privacy-placement
method is not restricted to using the resolution as a metric
and more complex similarity metrics can be utilized.
• pipeline parallelism: A key idea in our privacy-aware
placement approach is to allow processing a stream of
video frames in a pipeline fashion. Pipelining allows
utilizing both TEE1 and TEE2. For example, while the
TEE1 is processing the first part of the neural network
for the second video frame, TEE2 will be processing the
second part of the neural network for the previous frame.
Figure 5 shows the execution and transmission time for
executing a neural network in three different cases: (1)
all layers of the NN are deployed on the TEE1 (left
column), (2) the NN is partitioned across TEE1 and E2
(middle column), and (3) the NN is partitioned across
TEE1 and TEE2 (right column). Figure 5 shows that
the best completion time for one frame is the second case
when NN is partitioned across TEE2 and E2 (610 ms).
However, when we have a stream of 1000 frames, the best
completion time is the third case (i.e., Multiple TEEs).
The reason is pipelined execution which means that
when both TEE1 and TEE2 are concurrently processing
different frames, the completion time becomes bounded
by the completion time of the slowest device. In the case
of one enclave and one regular CPU (middle column),
the enclave has to process more than half of the layers to
reach a point where the resolution is less than threshold
Fig. 5. Comparison between the execution time of a NN in three different
cases: all layers in TEE1 (left), layers partitioned across TEE1 and E2
(middle), layers partitioned across TEE1 and TEE2 (right).
Fig. 6. Pipelined execution of 3 video frames (n = 3) for the partitioned
NN in the middle column of Figure 5.
δ, which makes the bulk of the workload skewed towards
the slower device (TEE1). However, in case of multiple
TEEs, the layers can be more evenly divided across the
TEEs which results in better chunk completion time
than the other two cases. Using multiple enclaves has an
additional benefit that it has no privacy leakage because
the intermediate data can only be decrypted in TEE2
unlike the middle case in which the intermediate data
can be processed in untrusted processor E2.
Cost Calculation for different placements: To better
illustrate how the completion time of a partitioned NN is
calculated, we show an example of the pipelined execution
in Figure 6. Figure 6 depicts the execution for a chunk of
three video frames. From Figure 6, we notice that at the
same time that video frame 2 is being processed at TEE2,
video frame 1 is being transmitted over the network and
processed at E2. Hence, the completion time of executing a
chunk of n frames on a neural network that follows placement
Pj = (TEE1, TEE1, TEE1, E2) is calculated as:
tchunk
(
n = 3, Pj) = 3 ∗ (e1,TEE1 + e2,TEE1
+e3,TEE1) + tr(E1
DL1−−−→ E2) + e4,E2
(1)
We note that for a large chunk of frames n, the chunk
completion time for the example in Figure 6 becomes bounded
by the first term only, which is the queuing time in the slowest
device TEE1.
tchunk
(
n, Pj) = n ∗ (e1,TEE1 + e2,TEE1
+e3,TEE1) + tr(E1
DL1−−−→ E2) + e4,E2
' n ∗ (e1,TEE1 + e2,TEE1 + e3,TEE1)
(2)
Algorithm Steps: The following steps are performed offline
once to find the best initial placement, then, the system keeps
monitoring the online profiling information for the execution
time of each NN layer and issues a re-partitioning when the
profiling information deviates from the predicted execution
times.
1) Step 1 - Construct placement tree to explore pos-
sible partitioning points: Figure 7 shows an example
placement tree for a NN with 3 layers. Each node in
the tree shows the placement of one or several layers,
where L1@TEE1 denotes that L1 is placed on TEE1
while L1 → L3@TEE1 denotes that L1, L2, L3 are
placed on TEE1. Each path Pj in the placement tree
is a possible solution for the privacy-aware placement
problem. The first level starts with possible placements
in TEE1 because the processing has to start in a trusted
resource. The second level shows possible placements of
the second part of the NN on either E1, E2, or TEE2
and the third level of the tree shows the possibility of
offloading layers from TEE2 to E2. Another level can
be added to the tree if the application requires that the
final layers get executed where the processing started in
TEE1. This is beneficial if the application requires the
object labels to be generated in a trusted resource.
2) Step 2 - Evaluate the execution time for each
path in the placement tree: For each path Pj in
the placement tree, we compute two values: (1) the
completion time tchunk(n, Pj) according to Equation 2,
(2) the maximum similarity computed as: SimPj =
max(Sim(I(L1), I(Lx)),∀px ∈ Pj and px ∈ VRUT
This value defines the maximum privacy leakage across
the placement path.
3) Step 3 - Choose the optimal placement path: From
step 3, we get two sets Scompletion and SSim. The first
set contains completion times and second set contains
the similarity (i.e., privacy) value for each path Pj out
of the N possible paths in Figure 7:
Scompletion = {tchunk
(
n, Pj
)}j=Nj=0
SSim = {SimPj}j=Nj=0
We choose the optimal placement Pj that yields the
minimum completion time while the similarity is less
than threshold δ:
j∗ = argmin
j
(
Scompletion
)
such that SimPj < δ
Algorithm analysis: The algorithm complexity is bounded
by the number of paths N in the placement tree. As shown
in Figure 7, the tree has 3 levels. To calculate the complexity,
we compute the maximum degree at each level of the tree.
We denote the maximum degree at level 1 as deg1. The
maximum degrees at levels 2 and 3 are denoted as deg2 and
deg3, respectively. The upper bound on the total number of
paths N = O(deg1 ∗ deg2 ∗ deg3). Level 1 has M nodes
because there are M possible ways to partition a NN of M
layers across TEE1 and another device, therefore deg1 =M .
Each node in level 2 denotes where the second part of the
NN is executed. The second part can be executed in E1,
E2, or distributed among TEE2 and E2. Since there are
M − 1 ways to distribute M − 1 layers across TEE2 and
E2, then deg2 = 2 + (M − 1) = M + 1. Level 3 will
only have one possibility which is deploying the rest of the
layers on E2 so deg3 = 1. Based on the previous analysis
N = O(M ∗ (M + 1) ∗ 1) = O(M2). We note that this
analysis is based on the assumption that we have 2 TEEs, in
the general case with R TEEs, N = O(MR), where R is
Fig. 7. Placement Tree that shows possible placements for the example in
Figure 6. Each path is a solution to the privacy-aware placement problem
expected to be a small constant significantly lower than the
number of layers R << M .
VI. EVALUATION
System setup: The computing infrastructure consists of two
desktops. Both desktops have Intel Core i7-9700k (4.6 GHz)
CPU and 32 GB of memory. Both desktops are equipped
with Intel SGX trusted enclave technology. Each server has an
Nvidia RTX 2080 GPU. We control the bandwidth between the
two machines to be 30 Mbps which simulates an average wide
area network connection. We use Google Asylo [1] to deploy
gRPC services in the enclave and the NN inference is done
through TFtrusted [7] which provides integration between
Asylo, gRPC and TensorflowLite. Each of the devices has a
local dataflow engine, Apache NiFi, that handles data transfer
between operators within the device and we use Echo [24]
orchestration framework to handle the communication between
the two Nifi instances.
Models: We evaluate our system with well-known Con-
volutional neural network (CNN) models: (1) GoogLeNet,
(2) Alexnet, (3) Resnet, (4) Mobilenet, (5) Squeezenet. We
download the models from the Tensorflow Model Library [5],
pre-trained with the Imagenet (ILSVRC 2012) dataset.
Datasets: We experiment with three video surveillance
datasets [4]. The datasets vary in the object types (car, person,
boat), and locations (indoor, outdoor, different cities). We
experiment with surveillance datasets because they include
sensitive content such as faces and car license plates that
require processing in a privacy-preserving fashion. Our dataset
consists of 1 hour from each surveillance video and we sample
one frame per second so we get a total of 10800 frames.
The resolution of each frame is restricted to 224x224 pixels
because it is the input resolution required by all the models.
A. Latency and Resolution of Intermediate Layers Output
In this section, we conduct an experiment to show the
relationship between the latency of computing the output
of intermediate NN layers and the similarity between the
intermediate output compared to the original image. For each
of the five NN models, we pass an individual video frame to
the NN and we compute the latency of computing each of
the intermediate layer outputs. To visualize the intermediate
layer, we convert the tensor to a grid of small images (Fig-
ure 4) using TensorFlow CNN visualization tool. To assess
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inference and the resolution of the intermediate output.
Fig. 9. Example question in the second part of the user survey. Users are
asked to rank the images according to the similarity to the original image
(Resolution values are not shown to users).
the similarity between intermediate layers and the original
image, we get the resolution of a single image in the grid.
The resolution of a single image gives an estimate of the
privacy leakage from this intermediate layer. In Figure 8, we
plot the relationship between the percentage of time spent in
computing the intermediate output vs. the resolution of this
intermediate output. Figure 8 shows that the deeper the layer
is, the more time one spends to compute its output and the
less its resolution (i.e., correlation with the original input)
will be. However, an interesting insight in Figure 8 is that
different models tend to have different trends. For example,
for models like GoogLeNet, Squeezenet, one needs to spend
80% of the entire inference time to reach an intermediate
output with resolution of 20x20 pixels or less. However,
Alexnet and Resnet reach such resolution in less than 50%
of the inference time. From this experiment, we conclude that
each model can be partitioned differently based on how fast
the resolution drops. We will discuss different partitioning
strategies in Section VI-C.
B. User Study to find Resolution Threshold
In this section, we conduct user study to show the relation-
ship between the resolution of the intermediate layer’s output
and the ability of human subjects to recognize the objects
in the image. The study is divided into two parts. In the first
part, we display the intermediate output of several layers from
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Fig. 11. Percentage of human subjects
who rank an image in the same posi-
tion as resolution-based ranking.
each model and we ask each user to identify the object in
this intermediate output. In the second part of the survey, we
show the users an original image and 5 sample images, where
each image is an output of a random layer of the same NN
model. The users are asked to rank these images based on how
representative they are compared to the original image. Ten
subjects took part in this study. They had normal/corrected-
to-normal vision.
Data Generation Process: For the first part of the study,
we collect 100 images from Imagenet’s image classification
dataset. Each image has a single object and the objects belong
to 10 classes: Cat, Dog, Car, Truck, Bus, Aeroplane, Boat,
Horse, Elephant, and Person. We use the same 5 NN models,
described in the previous section, to generate the intermediate
output. For each model, we pick 5 layers that have distinct
resolution values. We choose a random image from the dataset
to generate the output of each layer. We end up with 25 outputs
for this part of the survey and we ask the users to identify the
object in each of the 25 images. For the second part of the
survey, we choose one image at random for each model, then
we pass the image by different layers of the model, and we
generate the output of 5 layers that have distinct resolution
values. We shuffle the order of the layers’ outputs and we ask
the users to rank them based on the similarity to the original
image. Figure 9 shows an example question shown to the users.
Protocol: Each subject is asked to fill the survey individu-
ally. We present each subject with a link to a web form with
30 questions: in 25 questions he/she is asked to identify the
object in the image and in 5 of them he/she was asked to sort
images based on their similarity to the original image. We ask
the subjects to resize the images as much as they can to try
to identify the objects.
Discussion and Results: In the first part of the survey, we
calculate the accuracy at which the users were able to identify
the objects. In Figure 10, we plot the accuracy with respect to
the resolution values. The figure shows that human subjects
were able to identify the object with 100% accuracy when the
resolution is above 110x110. The accuracy degrades slightly
when the resolution is in the range 26x26 - 32x32 pixels,
and it drops drastically when the resolution is in the range
12x12 - 18x18 pixels. Hence, we conclude that a resolution
below 20x20 pixels is the sweet spot at which the objects in
an image are hardly identifiable. For the second part of the
survey, we evaluate how often the ranking of humans matches
the ranking based on the highest to lowest resolution. For each
question (e.g., Figure 9), we rank the images from 1 to 5
based on the resolution where rank 1 represents the highest
resolution and rank 5 represents the lowest resolution. For each
ranked image, we calculate the percentage of human subjects
who ranked it the same way as the resolution. We plot the
results in Figure 11. The results show an interesting insight that
human subjects have different opinions about which images
rank as the most similar to the original image (rank 1). On
the other hand, there was a general consensus among human
subjects and resolution metric about which images should rank
last (ranks 4 and 5). We conclude that when the resolution is
high, the objects are well identifiable and human subjects rank
images differently, but everybody agrees on the ranking when
the image resolution is below 20x20 pixels.
C. Neural Network Partitioning
In this section, we show the impact of our neural network
partitioning. We compare between the following strategies:
1) 1 TEE: the entire NN is deployed in one TEE,
2) No pipelining: this approach is adopted by related
work in mobile computing literature [28] and a recent
NN inference system (Neurosurgeon [20]). In those
approaches, NN partitioning is designed to minimize the
latency of one frame (n = 1) and they do not consider
the cases when a stream of frames arrives in a short
period of time.
3) 1 TEE & 1 GPU: We use the proposed method in
Section V to find the layer to offload to the GPU
such that the layer we partition at has an output with
resolution less than 20x20 pixels (In this approach, we
do not consider having the second TEE in the available
resources).
4) 2 TEEs: The neural network is partitioned across two
TEEs according to the algorithm in Section V (In this
approach we do not consider offloading to a CPU/GPU).
5) Proposed: We partition the neural network considering
all available resources (2 TEEs and one GPU).
Figure 12 shows the speedup in the end-to-end execution of
the entire dataset of 10800 frames for the different approaches
compared to the baseline that uses 1 TEE for the entire
processing. For the approaches that employ partitioned NN, the
speed up is measured on the end-to-end execution time which
includes: the time to process both parts of the NN, and the time
to encrypt and transmit intermediate outputs. From the results,
we observe that for three of the above models (GoogleNet,
Mobilenet and Squeezenet) using 2 TEEs outperforms using
1 TEE and 1 GPU because in the latter case most of the
processing happen in the slow TEE which results in 1.15-1.5x
speedup over using 1 TEE for the entire execution. On the
other hand, 2 TEEs can achieve 1.8 to 1.95x speedup for the
same three models because the model processing is almost
equally distributed across the enclaves. However, the results
are different in the other 2 models (Alexnet, Resnet) because
the majority of the workload happens in the fast GPU resulting
in 2.5-3.1x for 1 TEE & 1 GPU compared to a speedup of
2.2-2.3x for 2 TEEs.
We note that the proposed approach can go beyond using 2
TEEs by using 2 TEEs and 1 GPU resulting in the best speed
up 3.2-4.7x. The best speedup happens in Alexnet because
each TEE can do only 19% of the processing leaving the
remaining 62% to the fast GPU. Our final observation on
Figure 12 is that the No pipelining baseline ends up choosing
the same decision as 1 TEE & 1 GPU because its partitioning
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Fig. 12. Speedup comparison between various NN partitioning approaches.
decision is based on one frame only and it fails to consider
that the second TEE used to process the next frame while the
first TEE is processing the current frame.
D. Inference latency and overhead on TEE
In this section, we analyze the time it takes to perform
an inference on a single frame using one vs. two TEEs. We
note that in the case of two enclaves we analyze the time
to process the first part of the NN in TEE1, the time to
encrypt the intermediate output in TEE1, the time to transmit
the intermediate output to TEE2, the time to decrypt the
intermediate output, and, the time to process the second part
of the NN in TEE2. We note that not all these times are
added together in the presence of a stream of frames because
of pipeline parallelism but in this section we show it for a
single frame. We show a breakdown of the different execution
times in Figure 13. The figure shows that distributing the
layers across the enclaves have an additional benefit that it
reduces the memory requirements per enclave resulting in a
faster overall execution. As shown in the figure the sum of
execution times in both enclaves is less than the execution
time of the entire network in one enclave in 4 of the 5
models. The result is more pronounced in Alexnet because it
is the largest model (243 MB). Conversely, Squeezenet does
not show a similar trend because it is the smallest model (5
MB) and partitioning its layers does not have a significant
impact on the memory. We notice that the encryption and
decryption times using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
with 128-bit key is negligible (i.e., less than 2.5 ms/frame)
compared to the other times so we omit it from the figure.
The transmission time ranges from 0.01 to 0.12 seconds based
on the size of the intermediate layer and it is less significant
than computation time. The computation time represents the
largest portion of the processing due to the limited hardware
resources in the TEE, the computation time ranges from 1.1
seconds for Squeezenet to 7.2 seconds for Resnet.
VII. DISCUSSION
Other deep learning models: The deep learning models
we experimented with in this paper belong to the object
detection/classification category which represents an important
and widely deployed subset of all video processing. However,
many of these models produce lower resolution images deeper
down the network which is not the case for other deep learning
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Fig. 13. Execution time of NN inference per frame when deployed in 1 TEE
and 2 TEEs.
architectures such as UNet architecture which is the state of the
art for image segmentation tasks. For UNet-like architectures,
our approach should handle it using the multiple enclaves setup
in which each subset of the model is executed inside a trusted
enclave device.
Security Attacks and Guarantees: Previous research [11]
has shown some attacks that intend to reconstruct the original
input from the intermediate layers output of a NN. Such
attacks are also known as Input Reconstruction Attacks. To
perform such attacks, the adversary has to either have (1) the
model parameters that lead the input image to be transformed
to the intermediate layer output, or (2) the ability to query
the model to generate pairs of images and their corresponding
intermediate output, such pairs can be used later to recover the
model parameters. Our framework prevents this attack because
the model parameters can only be decrypted inside the enclave
that is rented by the user. The attacker (cloud provider) cannot
see the model parameters that are executed inside the enclave.
In addition, the user can add an authentication mechanism [13]
to block any external adversaries from querying their enclave
device which prevents the adversary from obtaining image and
intermediate output pairs.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Privacy Preserving Machine Learning: Several ap-
proaches have been proposed to address the challenge of
running machine learning (ML) workloads with reasonable ac-
curacy while maintaining data confidentiality. Cryptographic-
based [12] approaches are based on two main concepts: fully
homomorphic encryption (FHE) and secure multiparty com-
munication (SMC) which allows machine learning predictions
to operate on encrypted without ever decrypting it and the
output of the computation is the same as if it happened on
unencrypted data. Although such systems achieve reasonable
accuracy, their current performance makes them not practical
for production environments. On-device inference [27] [17]
has also been proposed to perform ML in a privacy preserving
manner through processing parts of the application in the
client’s device. However, on-device inference incurs high
energy cost and significantly affects the lifetime of battery-
operated devices. The approach that we adopt in this paper
is to use Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) such as
Intel SGX which have significant performance benefits over
homomorphic encryption and do not incur the significant
energy cost associated with on-device inference.
Machine Learning in SGX: Several systems have proposed
to run machine learning workloads in Intel SGX to preserve
data confidentiality [16] [18] [26] [21] [22]. However, none of
them have addressed the problem of partitioning computation
across multiple enclaves or highlighted the tradeoff between
using multiple enclaves vs. one enclave and another proces-
sor. Occulmency [21] and Myelin [18] focus on accelerating
the computation within one enclave. Occulmency proposes
memory-efficient techniques for computing convolution and
incrementally loading model parameters instead of loading
the entire model at once. Serdab can benefit from such
optimizations to accelerate the inference on the partial DNN
deployed in each Enclave. Chiron [16] focuses on training
ML models while keeping the model parameters protected
from the user, Serdab however focuses on inference rather
than training and the model parameters are owned by the user
and protected from the cloud provider. Yerbabuena [13] and
Slalom [26] focus on offloading part of the computation to a
colocated processor. Serdab goes beyond this work by offering
partitioning across multiple enclaves and exploring the privacy
tradeoffs that it entails.
Neural Network Partitioning: Existing neural network
inference systems, such as Clipper [10], TensorFlow Serv-
ing [6] focus mainly on ease of deployment, where the entire
neural network is considered as a black box and deployed into
one Docker container. However, they miss the opportunity of
leveraging hierarchical clusters through deploying some layers
of the neural network on the edge server and the rest of
the layers in a remote cloud or another edge server. On the
other hand, recent systems that have proposed placement of
neural network operations across hierarchy of resources such
as VideoEdge [15], and Neurosurgeon [20] did not consider
partitioning a neural network for a stream of video frames
which requires modeling pipeline parallelism. Both systems
base their partitioning/placement decisions on a single video
frame rather than a stream of frames.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present Serdab, a framework for analyzing
video streams across multiple enclave devices to preserve
data privacy. Serdab allows partitioning deep neural network
layers across multiple devices. We leverage two insights to
find the best placement of NN layers across devices. The
first insight is that the intermediate output of shallow NN
layers tends to be more similar to the original input than the
output of deeper layers, hence the enclave can run only the
shallow layers until the output is not correlated to the original
input. We validate our findings by conducting a user study
and we realize that users cannot figure out the objects in the
image when the resolution of layer’s output is less than 20x20
pixels. The second insight that we leverage in this work is
pipeline parallelism which happens when both enclaves are
concurrently processing different frames which improves the
completion time compared to running the majority of the
workload in one enclave. Our results show that for a stream
of 10,800 frames, our partitioning strategy achieves up to 4.7x
speedup compared to executing the entire neural network in
one enclave.
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